RECENT CASES.*
BIU.s A%n No-:s-FoR(; iv-FcrTovs PAYEF-The New York Agency
of the plaintiff Insurance Company issued drafts on the defendant bank.
making as payees certain policy holders whom one C, a loss clerk, fraudu-

lently rcpresented as having sustained losses. C. forged the endorsements of the
payees and deposited the drafts which were. according to regulations, ac-

cepted by the home office of the insurance company and later paid by the defendant bank The insurance company then brought suit to recover the
amounts so paid. Held: The plaintiff may recover. National Union Insur.
ance Co. v. Mellon National Bank, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, decided
January 3, 1923.

The relation between bank and depositor is a contractual one and under
it the bank is authorized to pay only to the payee or order designated by the
drawer. Robarts v. Tucker, 16 Q. B.5oo (Eng. i8ji); Houser v. Chambersburg National Bank, 2 Pa. Super. 613 (19o5); McXeely v. Bank of North
America, 22i Pa. 588. 7o At. &8i(i9o). Therefore a bank cannot charge
a depositor's account with an amount paid by it on a forged cndorsement,
Washington First National Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 (8;6); Cunninghani v. Indiana First National Bank, 219 Pa. 31o, 68 Att. 731 (19o8);
Jordon Marsh Co. v. Shawmut Bank, 2oi Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 74o (igog);
unless the depositor has been negligent, Harter v. Mechanic's National Bank,
63 N.J. L 578, 44 At. 715 (1899); Armour v. Greene County State Bank, nt2
Fed. 631, 50 C. C. A. 399 (1902); or unless the money has been paid over to
the person who was intended by the drawer to receive it, States v. Montrose
First National Bank, -o3 Pa, 69, 52 Atl. 13. (19o); or has reached the
drawer himself. Andrews v. Northwestern National Bank, io7 Minn. i9G6,
117 N. V. 621 (1908).
A negotiable instrument is payable to bearer, however, under the N. I. L.
"When it is payable to the order of a fictitious payee or non-existing person
and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." Act of May 16.
P. L. 194 Sec. 9 (3); Seaboard National Bank v. Bank of America, 193
19Io,
N. Y. -6,85 N. E. 8-'9 (908). The English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882,
Sec. 7 (3) provides that "Where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person the bill may be treated as payable to bearer," and so makes immaterial the
drawer's ignorance of the fiction, or non-existence of the payee. Bank of
England v. Vagliano Brother., L R. (i8g) A. C. 107; Clutton v. Attenborough, L.R. (1897) A. C. go.
*The following Recent Cases are discussed in the Notes, supra: Lee v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Rwy. Co., U. S. Adv. Ops. 256 (1922-23); McCoy v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Co, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, No. 40, October Term,
1922; Wagner v. Mittendorf, 232 N. Y. 481 (1922); Lente v. Lucci, 119 AtL
132 (Pa. 1922); Wilson v. Eisner, 282 Fed. 38 (C. C. A. 1922); Standard
Oil Co. v. Federal Trade. Commission, 282 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 1922) ; Federal
Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., U. S. Adv. Ops. 231 (1922-23);
City of Boston v. Jackson, U. S. Adv. Ops. 144 (19=.-23); Sokoloff v. The

National City Bank of New York, zig Misc. Rep. 332 (N. Y.
(275)

1922).
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The court in the instant case held that the payees of the drafts were not
"fictitious" within the meaning of the N. I. L This decision seems correct
and is in line with the other Pennsylvania cases. Second National Bank v.
Trust Co., 206 Pa. 616, 56 Atd. 72 (19o3); Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. North Penn Bank, 70 Pa. Super. 34 (igi8).
CONSTITUTIONAL" LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAws-ALoW¢o ATe
rORNEY FEI S TO SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFF.-The plaintiff claimed under a statute of Nebraska which made all common carriers, failing within sixty days
to settle for damage to intrastate shipments liable for a reasonable attorney's
fee both in the trial court and on appeal if the successful claimant recovered
more than the sum offered by the carrier in settlement. To the demand of the
shipper, the carrier made no offer in settlement. The trial court reduced the
plaintiff's original claim and upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the verdict
was still further reduced. But attorney fees were assessed upon the defendant in both courts. Held: The statute is constitutional as to the original
fees but unconstitutional as to those in the appellate court. Chicago and N.
IV. Ry. Co. v. Nyc Schneider Fowler Co., U. S. Adv. Ops. 46 (1922-23).
As a general rule, the courts have allowed the states, in the exercise of
their police power, to grant reasonable penalties to successful plaintiffs for
damages in intrastate shipments despite the absence in the statute of a like
provision for successful defendants. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S.
642 (1914); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73 (i9o7);
Yazoo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217 (i912). But such
penalties or fees must not be so oppressive as to violate the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354
(19x1) ; Atchinson, etc., Ry. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56 (i9i); Stupeck
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 2oo Fed. i9z (D. C. i912).
Different interpretations of "reasonable penalty" have led to some confusion. The Supreme Court first considered the question in Gulf, etc., R. Co.
v. Ellis, x65 U. S. i5o (1897), in which a Texas statute allowing an attorney's
fee to successful plaintiffs upon claims not paid within a certain time, was held
unconstitutional on the ground that it was a penalty to compel railroads to pay
their debts and was therefore discriminatory against them as a general class
of debtors. In Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers, supra, and later Supreme
Court cases, similar statutes were held constitutional as a legitimate means
of securing reasonably prompt settlement of proper claims. Missouri, etc.,
Ry. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412 (1914); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Larabee,
234 U. S. 459 (1914) ; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Cade, supra.
In some statues held valid, the penalty or fee is allowed only on condition
that the recovery equals or exceeds the claim which the carrier failed to pay.
Riskin v. Great Northern R. Co., 126 Minn. 138, 147 N. W. 960 (1914) ; Southern R. Co. v. Lowe, 139 Ga. 362, 77 S. E. 44 (ii3) ; Tilley v. Southern R. Co.,
go S. E. 3og (N. C. 1916). Where the statute allowed fees if the amount recovered was equal to that sued for but less than amount originally claimed,
it was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, St Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v.
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Wynne, supra. Similarly a statute providing that only a tender by the railroad within sixty days of the full amount of the damage could save double
damages, was declared void; it compelled defendant to guess rightly the verdict of a jury. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U. S. 165 (1914). In that
case the claim was predicated on damage to property along the track caused
by a spark from a locomotive. In distinguishing that case from the one at
bar, Chief Justice Taft points out that damage to freight is more peculiarly
within the knowledge of the railroad than damage caused by the operation
of its trains. The court felt that in the principal case it was easy for the railroad to appraise accurately the damage. Yet it is submitted that any estimate
on the part of the company must still of necessity be a guess because no man
can foresee what verdict a jury will award. As in Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Polt, supra, the burden is on the railroad to make a correct guess. The court's
reasoning in declaring unconstitutional the second portion of the statute could
as well be applied to the first part.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POW.R-KOnLEn AcT HuD UNCONSTITU'IONAL.-A Pennsylvania statute prohibited the mining of anthracite coal so
as to cause a subsidence of the surface under any dwelling in a township of
three hundred or more inhabitants. The statute further provided that an injunction might issue to protect against its violation. Prior to the passage of
the act, the defendant coal company conveyed land to the plaintiffs, reserving
the right to mine coal without allowing for surface support. The plaintiffs
sought to restrain the defendant company from carrying out the contract.
Held (Brandeis, J., dissenting): The act is unconstitutional. Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. H. I. Mahon et al., United States Supreme Court, No. 549 October
Term, 1922.

The act in quesion is the Act of May 27, 192,

P. L. ig8.

This decision reverses that of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which
upheld the Kohler Act as a valid exercise of the police power. See Mahon
t al. v. Pennsylvania Coal Company, 274 Pa. 489 (192). The main grounds
upon which the court in the principal case based its judgment are: (i) The
statute operated substantially to appropriate the company's property without
compensation; (2) the extent of the taking was very great-going far beyond
any legislation heretofore invoked even in case of emergency; (3) the fact that
the risk, assumed by the plaintiffs in purchasing only surface rights, became a
danger did not warrant giving them greater rights than they bought; (4) the
safety of the public did not require such a statute, since notice of the mining
would be sufficient to warn them. The rent cases, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S.
135 (192o); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. i7o (x920);

and Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, U. S. Adv. Ops. (1921-22), were disposed of
by saying that the acts there involved were passed during an emergency and provided for compensation. Another case, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 23z
U. S. 531 (1913), was also distinguished, on the ground that the requirement
of a coal pillar between adjacent properties was a measure of safety to the
miners and secured an average reciprocity of advantage. The dissenting opinion denied that the act appropriated property, and asserted that it merely
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prevented its use in a way dangerous to the public; that it was for a public
purpose; that the opinion of the legislature and Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refuted the proposition that notice would remove the danger; that
existing contracts could not preclude an .exercise of the police power; that
reciprocity of advantage was applicable only to the situation where the police
power was exercised to bestow benefits upon a neighborhood, such as drainage; that mining so as to cause subsidence would be a public nuisance, being
a danger kindred to that of poisonous gases. For discussion and cases supporting this view, see 71 U. oF PA. L REV. 77 (1922-23).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICF POWER-REGULATION OF TAxicAns.-A New
York statute required taxicab owners to file a bond or insurance policy in
the sum of $25oo for each vehicle operated, conditioned for payment of any
judgment recovered for negligent operation, and provided that there should be
a continuing liability thereunder notwithstanding any recovery on it. The
defendant never filed a bond or insurance policy and was convicted for unlawfully operating a taxicab. He appealed on the ground that the act violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Held: The statute is constitutional. People v. Martin i97 N. Y. S. 28 (App. Div. 1922). The statute in question is Chapter

62, Laws of 192. (section 282-b of the Highway Law).

That vehicles in the business of carrying passengers for hire are subject
to regulation by the state under the police power cannot be seriously disputed.
The extent to which this regulation may be carried is the only problem. In
Swam v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 132 Aid. 256, io3 Atl. 441 (i918), a statute
designating and regulating the use and occupation of hack stands in Baltimore was upheld against the objection that it deprived persons of their business or property without due process of law. In the Taxicab Cases, 143 N.
Y. S. 279 (Sup. Ct. i913), affirmed in 144 N. Y. S. 299 (App. Div. 1913),
an ordinance requiring taxi-meters on motor-driven vehicles for -hire and
regulating the business of public hackmen was held not to be unduly discriminatory within the Fourteenth Amendment, though the same statute established a lower rate for motor than for horse-drawn vehicles. The regulation
of automobile transportation generally has been held to be within the police
power and not to invade the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Haddad et al. v. State, 2o Pac. 847 (Ariz. 192r). An act regulating the
issuance of certificates to jitney owners was held not invalid even though it
authorized the Public Utilities Commission to grant certificates to some and
to refuse others, since such power was deemed necessary to enable that body
effectually to regulate the business. State v. Darazzo, In8 AtI. 8i (Conn.
1922). The requirement of an indemnity bond or an insurance policy, in the
case of taxicabs, with continuing liability notwithstanding recovery thereon,
seems a normal and effective method of protecting the public from the recklessness of drivers and of insuring at least partial recovery for injuries sustained through the drivers' negligence. Such legislation has been upheld in
Arkansas, California, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and West Virginia. See In re Cardinal,
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x7o Cal. 5i9, i5o Pac. 348 (1915); West v. Asbury Park. 89 N. J. L. 402, 99
231 Mass. 386 121 N. E. 30
In Pennsylvania, however, parts of an ordinance which excluded
(1918).
personal sureties upon the required bond and exacted a $25oo bond with continuing liability were held unreasonable and therefore invalid. Jitney Bus
Association v. Wilkes-Barre, 236 Pa. 462, ioo At. 954 (1917). This decision

At. i9o (ig96); Commonwealth v. Theberge,

was followed in State ex rel. Stevenson v. Dillon, 82 Fla. 276, 89 So. 558
(192i), where the ordinance required a bond for $5ooo with continuing liability. The continuing liability clause seems to have been regarded as immaterial in all the cases except the Pennsylvania and Florida cases, supra.
COMMERC.CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION BY STATE-INTERSTAT
Logs on their way to New Hampshire were floated down a stream in Vermont, the state of origin. After part of the journey had been completed it
became necessary to detain the logs in a pond because the stream was flooded
and frozen. While thus stopped in Vermont, the logs were taxed by the

town of Brattleboro. Held: The tax is unconstitutional.
Co. v. Brattleboro, Supreme Court of United States, No

Chomplain Realty
October Term,

12,

1922.

Goods in actual, continuous transit between two states cannot be taxed
by a state; such taxation would be a direct burden on interstate commerce.
This is also true of goods which have come to rest temporarily but which
cannot be said to have become part of the general mass of property in the
state. Where the goods are halted of necessity by some natural cause or
lack of facilities for immediate transportation, the halt being made in order
that the goods may be enabled to continue the journey effectively, the imposition of local taxes is invalid. State v. Carrigan, io Vroom 35 (N. J. 1876);
Coe v. Errol, 62 N. H. 303, 313 (1882) ; Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. i (i9o).
On the other hand where the goods are halted in order to accomplish some
business purpose not directly ancillary to the transit, such goods become part
of the general mass of property in a state and thus subject to the general
taxation of the state, as, for example, at a distribution point, American Steel
and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 50o (i9o3); in an elevator for inspection,
Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 5o4 (1913); in storage to facilitate the filling
of orders, Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665 (1913).
Property which is merely being prepared for interstate commerce and has
not yet entered it, is of course, taxable by the state. Coe v. Errol, 1i6 U.
1U. S. 8z (19o3).
S. 517 (1886) ; Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 88
Where the goods have arrived at their point of destination they are
taxable by the state although still in the original package. Brown v. Houston,
114 U. S. 622 (x885); Pittsburgh, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577
Having come to rest for final disposal and use, the goods become
(1895).
part of the mass of taxable goods in the state. The power of the state to;
tax, however, does not necessarily indicate that the goods are no longer in
interstate commerce; see 71 U. or P& L Rxv. 132 (1922-23), but only that
the tax is not a burden on interstate commerce. Where it is a burden, it will
not be allowed, as, for example, where the tax is on interstate goods only
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and not on all goods indiscriminately. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123
(U. S. 1868) ; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875) ; Lyng v. Michigan, 135
U. S. i61 (189o). The principal case is in accord with former cases. The
continuity of the trip was clearly not broken by the enforced detention of the
logs; and the state tax on the goods while actually in transitu was invalid.
CONTRACTS-ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EvWEcE-TRADE Taas.-The plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant a certain amount of ferro-tungsten
powder, in accordance with a written contract, which specified that the substance should be "free from tin." The defendant, contending that the plaintiff had not complied with the terms of the contract, refused to pay the purchase price. At the trial parol evidence was admitted to prove that it was a
custom of the trade to regard the expression "free from tin" to mean "commercially free from tin," and that the expression was so used by the
parties. Held: Parol evidence was properly admitted. Electric Reduction Co.
v. Colonial Steel Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania No. i2, October
Term, 1922 (not yet reported).
It is a general rule of law that parol evidence is not admissible to vary
the terms of a written contract. If the language is explicit, a meaning cannot be given to it different from that conveyed by an ordinary construction of its terms. Nat'l. Bank v. Burkhart, ioo U. S. 686 (1879); Horn v.
Miller, r42 Pa. 557, 21 Atl. 994 (891) ; Stephen, Evidence, 444 (Pa. ed. 1904).
But, when particular expressions are used in reference to transactions within
certain trades, and have by usage acquired an unusual meaning, parol evidence is admissible to show the real sense in which they were used. Brown v.
Byrne, 3 E. & B. 703 (Eng. 1854); Guillon v. Earnshaw, 169 Pa. 463, 32 Att.
545 (895) ; Procter v. Atlantic Fish Co., 208 Mass. 351, 94 N. E. 281 (i9i ).
The courts admit parol evidence in such cases not to vary the terms of the
contract, but in order to determine the intention of the parties and the real
meaning of the terms, when these cannot be ascertained from the contract itself. Bliven v. New England Co. 23 How. 420 (U. S. 1859); Collender v.
Dinsmore, 5 N. Y. 2oo (1873); Morris v. Supplee, 208 Pa. 253, 57 AtL 566
(1904).
Persons engaged in a particular trade are presumed to know its customs
and usages. Furthermore, when they contract and make use of the trade
terms, it is presumed that they contracted in view of the usages, and the contract is viewed as though the special meaning of the words were expressed.
Carter v. Phila. Coal Co., 77 Pa. 286 (1875); Roylance Co. v. Descalzi, 243
Pa. i8o, 0 Atl. 55 (1914) ; Silverstein v. Michau, 221 Fed. 55, 137 C. C. A. 79
(1915). In order to exclude such presumptions, it is necessary for the parties
to stipulate expressly that the terms were used without regard to the usages
of the trade. Evans v. Western Mfg. Co., 118 Mo. 548, 24 S. W. 175 (1893) ;
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Lykens, 274 Pa. i9o, 117 Atl. 78o (Ig).
Whether or not there is a usage in the trade which is sufficiently well recognized is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury. Silverstein v.
Michau, supra. The principal case gives a comprehensive review of the
Pennsylvania authorities on the subject.

RECENT CASES
EV1DECa-CORWS DFicri-PRooF By EXTRAJUDICIAL CO.VFFaSszoxs.-At a
trial for murder the Commonwealth, after -ttempting to establish the corpus
delicti by very inconclusive evidence, introduced the defendant's extrajudicial
confession. No objection was made to its introduction on the ground that the
corpits delicti had not yet been proved. The court refused to instruct the
jury that before considering the confession they should first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence other than the confession that the deceased had met death through the criminal act of some -one other than
himself.
ld: The refusal zo to charge was error. Judgment reversed.
Commonwealth v. Puylise, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, decided January
29, 192-3.
As used here the term corpus delicti, means the commission of the crime
charged without reference to the identity of the accused as the doer of it. In
the relationship between the proof of the corpus delicti and an extrajudicial
confession by the defendant connecting himself with the crime, there are two
important considerations: (i) the order of proof at the trial; (2) the order
in which the jury should pass upon the evidence. It is the American rule at
common law and under codes that an extrajudicial confession alone will not
warrant conviction for a felony; it must be corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti. State v. Dubois, 54 Iowa 363, 6 N. W. 578 (i8o) ;
Gore v. People, 162 11. 259 (8g6) ; Messel v. State, x6 Ind. 214, 95 N. E.
z,6S (igii); People v. Roach, 215,N. Y. 592 (9195); Daeche v. United
States, 25o Fed. 566, 162 C. C. A. 582 (1918). The English and Irish rule
probably is contra except in cases of homicide. See Regina v. Unkles (1874),
Jr. R. 8 C L 50; Regina v. Sullivan, (Eng. i887) 16 Cox Cr. 347-in each
a lesser offense was charged. Cases often cited as English authorities are
not in point. See those collected and distinguished in Wigmore, Evidence, 11,
Sec. 2o7o, note 4 (1904). Wigmore and Greenleaf differ in opinion on the
relative merits of the two rules. Wigniore, Evidence, supra, in See. o7o;
Greenleaf, Evidence, I, Sec. 217 (1896). Whether the introduction of the
independent evidence should precede the admission of the confession is
largely within the trial court's discretion; it is better practice to follow that
order. State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 368 (i86o); People v. Jones, 123 Cal. 6S, 55
Pac. 6. 8 (1898). Though failure to do this be error, it will be cured by the
subsequent introduction of sufficient additional evidence to justify its admission. Floyd v. State, 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 683 (1886); Holland v. State, 39 Fla.
178, 22- So. 28 (1897). Pennsylvania permits proof of a confession as soon
as the Commonwealth has introduced sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti
for the case to go to the jury. Gray v. Commonwealth, ioi Pa. 380 (1882).
In Pennsylvania the jury, before considering the confession, must first be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the other evidence that the crime
charged was committed. Gray v. Commonwealth, supra. This judicious rule
is followed in no other jurisdiction, except perhaps in Alabama. Bergen v.
People, 17 Ill. 426 (1856); White v. State, 4o Tex. Crim. 366 (1899); State
v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 459 (1912); Daeche v. United States, supra; 68 L R. A.
33, note. See also State v. Nordstrom, 146 Minn. 136, 178 N. V. 164 (1920).
See dicta in Hardin v. State, i9 Ala. 50, 19 So. 494 (8gs); Johnson v.
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State, 13 Ala. App. 193, 68 So. 687 (1915).

The principal case, following

Gray v. Commonwealth. marks the first occasion in forty years in which an
appellate court of this jurisdiction has passed upon this rule.
EVIDEVXCF-RES GESTAE-STATENIIFTS MAD~nE
Uro- REC;AINI.G CoNSCIOUS-vEss.-The deceased was found after an accident by a fellow employee with
his arm and leg severely crushed. While suffering intense pain, deceased
talked with the other employee but gave no explanation of the cause of the
accident. Three-quarters of an hour later he was operated upon in a nearby
hospital. Upon coming out of the ether two hours later he made statements
regarding the cause of the accident. These were offered to prove that he was
acting within the scope of his employment. Held (two justices dissenting):
The statements were admissible. Clark v. Davis, i9o '7 W. '45 (Minn. 1922).
Under the "spontaneous utterance doctrine" which has grown up in this
country, statements to be admissible as part of the res gestae, need no longer
be precisely concurrent in point of time. Mitchum v. State, ii Ga. 675 (1852) ;
Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Morris, 8o Ark. 528, 98 S. W. 363 (igo6); Meyer v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 130 Minn. 242, 153 N. W. 523 (19:5).

If the declara-

tions spring out of the transaction itself and are made under such conditions as to remove the possibility of premeditation or design, they are considered to be part of the res gestae. Commonwealth v. Puntario, 271 Pa. 5o:
(192).

See 70 U. oF PA. L. RF'. 332 (:92i-22).

The first statements made

by an injured party regaining consciousness, which he had lost immediately
after the accident, are generally treated as being spontaneous. Smith v. Stoner,
:43 Pa. 57, 89 At. 795 (1914); Hobbs v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 742 Pac. --o
(Wash. 1914). See 63 U. oF PA. L REv. 139 (1914-I5).

The length of the period of unconsciousness is immaterial.
Butten v. Washington Power Co., 59 Wash. 440 io Pac. 2o (9o),

Thus in
statements

made eight days after the accident but a few minutes after gaining consciousness were held admissible. But wherever there seems to have been an opportunity for reflection or deliberation, the statements become narrative and
will not be considered spontaneous. Rogers v. State. 88 Ark. 451, 115 S. W.
i55 (igo8); Bionto v. Illinois C. R. Co., 125 La. 147, 51, So. 98 (Igo) ; State

v. B. & 0. R. Co., 117 Md. 28o, 83 Atl. 166 (i9t2). In Wescott v. Waterloo,
etc., Ry. Co., 173 Iowa 355, 155 N. W. 255 (1915), the deceased was conscious
three-quarters of an hour between the time of the accident and the operation,
during which time, although suffering intense pain, the deceased spoke rationally to the physician and nurses. Statements made immediately upon
coming out of the ether after the operation were held inadmissible as being too remote from the accident.
It is submitted that the minority opinion in the principal case is more in
accord with the Iowa decision and the weight of authority. The lapse of
time between the accident and the operation during which the deceased was
conscious, afforded an opportunity for "reflection and premeditation." Any
statement made two hours later under such circumstances necessarily lacked
that degree of spontaneity which is required to make it part of the res gesta.,.
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INTFRSTATE

COMNERCE-EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-NATURE OF

-MEPLOY-

FNT.-The plaintiff, whose duties consisted of switching interstate trains,
was injured while boarding an intrastate shuttle train furnished by the company to take its employees to work. Held: The plaintiff was injured while engaged in interstate commerce and hence he may recover damages under the
Federal Employers" Liability Act (Comp. St. 8657-8663). Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. z,. l'illiams, 284 Fed. 262 (C. C. A. 1922).
It has been held that an employee whose duties are interstate and who is
injured while going across the company's premises to work, is injured in interstate commerce. Phila. B. & IV. R. Co. v. Tucker, 35 App. D. C. 123, affirmed
in 2,o U. S. 6o8 (1go); Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Renty, 162 S. W. 959
(Tex. 1914). An employee injured on the premises when leaving his interstate work was also held to be injured in interstate commerce. North Carolina Ry. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248 (x913); Grow v. Oregon Short Line, 138
Pac. 398 (Utah 1914) ; Erie R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. i;o (1917). The
theory of these cases is that going to and coming from interstate work is so
closely related to it as to be part of it. In the principal case the injury was
somewhat more remote from the place of employment as the employee was
boarding a train to go there, but it seems a logical extension of the former
cases. The rule then would seem to be that any injury occurring on the company's premises no matter how far from the place of work, while the employee is on his way to or from interstate work is sustained in interstate commerce.
A Pennsylvania case, Knorr v. Central R. R. of N. I., -68 Pa. 17, tto AtL
797 (i9zo), in which a petition for a certiorarito the United States Supreme
Court was denied, 254 U. S. 644 (1920), held that a fireman, whose work
consisted of shifting interstate and intrastate trains, was not injured in interstate commerce when he left the premises after work and later boarded one of
the company's trains to go home and was injured on that train. The court
said his interstate relations had ceased when he left the premises. For a discussion of that case, see 69 U. OF P.. L REv. 392 (i919-20).
MASTER AND SERVAT-LIABILTY FOR CONDCr OUTSIDE SCOPE-OF EMsPL4ymENT-DAGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DocmixE.-An engineer who had been

entrusted with railroad torpedoes by the defendant company placed one on the
track and for his own amusement exploded it in order to frighten a fellow
employee. The latter was injured by the explosion. Held: The defendant
company was not liable. Goupiel v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 118 Atl. 586 (Vt.
1922).

The liability of a master for the negligent or willful act of his servant,
whereby another servant is injured, does not depend upon the doctrine of
respondeat superiorbut upon the violation of a duty owed by the master. Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Bridges, i44 Ala. 229, 39 So. 902 (iso5) ; Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. v. Moranda, 95 Ill. 30- (j879). Such a duty is imposed by the law of
torts upon masters who control dangerous instrumentalities. That it should be
a continuous duty resting upon the master personally and only at his peril to be
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delegated to another seems reasonable. Thougli its application to facts similar to those of the principal case might seem harsh, yet there is considerable
authority for doing so. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Shields, 47 Ohio St. 387, 24
N. E. 6_8 (1890); Euting v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., tz6 Wis. 13, 92 N. W. 358
(19o2).
The last named case is identical in its facts to the principal case
though decided contra.
This is the so-called "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine and has lately
been grafted to the law of agency by some states as a ground for holding
the master liable for the tortious act of his servant which otherwise might not
be brought within the scope of the authority. 2 Mechem, Agency, 1512 (2d ed.
1914).
In order to impose liability in agency cases, some jurisdictions have held
it to be essential that the servant whose act is complained of shall be the one
to whose custody the article was confided and that it was permitted to do the
injury while in his custody. Otherwise no liability attaches to the master.
Sullivan v. Louisville, etc., P_ Co., 115 Ky. 447, 74 S. W. 171 (i903) ; Obertoni v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 186 Mass. 481, 71 N. E. 98o (19o4). It is difficult,
however, to determine at times whether the particular instrument used to play
the joke or prank falls under the head of dangerous instrumentalities. The
test is not that the thing in question may be made the means of doing injury,
because the most inherently harmless thing may be so used. It is rather that
the article is a potentially dangerous one as, for example, gunpowder, poison,
spring-guns, and the like. 2 Mechem, Agency, 1516.
The court ;n deciding the principal case flatly rejected the "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine, supporting its decision mainly on the authority of Sullivan v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., supra; Obertoni v. R. R., supra; and a case
in which the instrument used was a compressed air tube, the inherently dangerous characteristics of which are at least questionable. Galveston, etc., Ry.
Co. v. Currie, ioo Tex. x36, 96 S. W. io73 (19o6). See 2 Mechem. Agency,
1514. It is submitted that the rule of these cases limits (as explained above)
rather than rejects the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and has no application under the facts of the principal case.

MORTGAGES-EFFECT OF STATUE OF LIMITATIONs UPoN A DEED SEctmm A

DEBr BARRED BY THE Sr.A'TU-The plaintiff sued on a security deed treating
it as a mortgage and asking a foreclosure sale to recover the money lent by
him to the defendant's testator. The latter had caused one E. to convey the
lots covered by the deed to the plaintiff by a (Iced absolute with no written
defeasance. As the debt was barred by the Washington statute of limitations,
the defendant contended that any action on the deed was also barred, field:
(four justices dissenting) For the defendant. Pratt v. Pratt, 209 Pac. 535
(Wash. 1922).
A creditor may hold and realize on collateral security, although the principal obligation is barred by the statute of limitations. Hartranft's Estate,
153 Pa. 530, a6 AtI. io4 (1893); Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dunscomb, 7o8
Tenn. 724, 69 S. W. 345 (go2) ; see 25 Cyc. iooi. The general rule is that
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when the security for a debt is not the property itself but a lien on property,
personal or real, the lien is not impaired merely because the remedy at law
for the recovery of the debt is barred. Bizzell v. Nix, 6o Ala. 28i (1877) ;
llulbert v. Clark, 128 N. Y. 29i, 28 N. E. 638 (i8gi) ; Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v.
Dunscomb, supra. By the weight of authority, if land is mortgaged, foreclosure proceedings may be maintained though action on the debt secured be
barred Hulbert v. Clark, supra; Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 37
At]. --66 (1897); Harper v. Raisin Fertilizer Co, 158 Ala. 329, 48 So. 589
(1909). But another line of decisions takes the view that a mortgage, being a
mere incident to the debt, is barred when the right to recovery on the debt is
destroyed, on the theory that the statute of limitations destroys all right to the
debt by the presumption that it has been paid. Dupree v. Mansur, 214 U. S.
i61 Igog) (applying the law of Texas); Mueller v. Light, 92 Ark. 52, 123
S. W. 646 (i9O9). The better and more general view, however, is that the
statute operates only on the Temedy and does not extinguish the right. Campbell v. Haverill, i55 U. S. 6io (1894) ; Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. and Ad. 413, 9
L. J. K. B. [O. S.] 262 (Eng. 1831) ; Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N. Y. 26T, 9t N.
E. 582 (igio); Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N. E. 402 (z9o8).
The jurisdiction of the principal case has repeatedly held that when the
statutory period has run against the debt, there is no longer any action on the
mortgage. Damon v. Leque, 17 Wash. 573, 50 Pac. 495 (1898); George v.
Butler, 26 Vash. 456, 67 Pac. 263 (9oi); Gleason v. Hawkins, 32 Wash.
464, 73 Pac. 533 (19o3). Washington is a lien state. Spokane County v.
Prescott, ig Wash. 418, 53 Pac. 661 (j898). The majority of the court undoubtedly felt themselves bound by these decisions.
They, however, draw no distinction between an ordinary mortgage and a
deed absolute with no accompanying written defeasance. In the case of a
deed absolute on its face, but in fact a mortgage, the title passes to the mortgagee almost universally, even in lien states. Walcop v. McKinney, io Mo.
2-9 (1846) ; McGehee v. Garringer, 284 Mo. 465, 224 S. W. 828 (i92o) ; Dickerson v. Williams, 151 Ga. 71, 105, S. E. 841 (i921) ; Minick v. Reichenbach, 97
Neb. 629, i5o N. W. xoox (1915). So that even in lien states which prohibit
recovery on an ordinary mortgage after the statute has run against the original
obligation, the better rule would seem to be that a recovery could still be
had on a deed absolute. Sturdivant v. McCorley, 83 Ark. 278, 1o3 S. W. 73
(i907).
Because, though the statute has run against the debt, title to the
land remains in the mortgagee and he can recover possession unless the defendant sets up the equitable defense that the deed was in equity; but when he
does this, a court of equity will not aid him to regain the legal title without
compelling him to do equity by paying the debt with interest.
In Pennsylvania, due to the practice of requiring a bond with the mortgage deed, a case similar to the principal one is not likely to arise. But if a
deed absolute without an accompanying defeasance were given as security for
a debt not evidenced by writing and the statute of limitations had run against
the debt, it would seem a forliori, that the mortgagee could recover, Pennsylvania being a title state.
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N1UIGENCE-EXIST-NCE OF DUTY NOT ARIsJ.IN OUT OF CONTRAcT-LIABIL
BECAUSE OF PROBABILITY OF INj:RY.-The defendants, who were public
weighers, were requested, by the vendors of certain merchandise, to weigh the
merchandise in question and make a return thereof to the vendors and tq
their prospective vendees, the plaintiffs. Relying on this return, which had been
negligently made, the plaintiffs overpaid the vendors, and now seek to recover
for the loss by an action against the public weighers. lleld: The defendants
are liable. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
Although the defendants are undoubtedly liable to the vendors for the
negligent performance of their contract, their liability to the plaintiffs in this
action is not based on any previous decisions. Where a contract calls for the
giving of information, the duty to use due care has never been extended to persons outside of the contractual relation. Savings Bank v. Ward, zoo U. S.
195 (1879) ; LeLievre v, Gould, L. . z Q. B. 491 (Eng. 1893) ; Moore v. Lancaster, 212 Pa. 642, 62 At. zoo (igos). Where the negligent performance of
a contract is also a negligent act causing direct injury to the person or property of a third person, there is then a liability to the injured third person,
which does not arise out of. the contract. Marshall v. York, etc., Ry., ix C. B.
655 (Eng. i8si) ; Hales v. Rames, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S. W. 425 (1910) ;
Burnham v. Stillings, 76 N. H. 122, 79 At. 987 (1911); Nelson v. Casey et
al., 279 Fed. too (1922). The liability in these cases is based on the assumption that one who acts, even though gratuitously, becomes subject to the duty
to act carefully. An attorney who was employed by a mortgagor, and who
delivered an incorrect absiract of title to the mortgagee, was held liable to the
mortgagee for such negligence. Lawall v. Groman, I8o Pa. 532, 37 Atl. 98
(1897). The sending of a copy of the return to the plaintiff in the principal
case seems to be such a service, that it may well carry with it a duty toward
the plaintiff to act carefully.
The maker of an article which "preserves, destroys or affects human
life" has an affirmative duty not to injure any person by his negligence. Thomas
v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852); Elkins v. McKean, 79 Pa. 493 (1875). The
same duty arises where the article, if defective, would be reasonably certain to
place life or limb in peril. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, in
N. E. io5o (16); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co, 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A.
i919); reversing 221 Fed. 8ot (C. C. A. i9is). See 68 U. oF PA. L. REV. 40D
(192o). This liability has been held to exist for damage to property. Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 16" App. Div. 433, 153 N. Y. 13r (1915). To apply
this theory of law to the facts of the principal case, would extend this liabiliy beyond injuries to person or property, and make the defendant liable
for a negligent act which injures by influencing another's governance of conduct.
This extension would seem to go too far. It would make a manufacturer
liable to any person who had purchased goods for their apparent value, and
then later discovered that their negligent manufacture made them less valuable.
The negligence, having caused a person to pay for better goods than he received. would be similar to that in the principal case, where the negligence
caused the plaintiff to pay for more goods than he received. Such an extreme
i'
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liability would seem to be a dangerous innovation, although it is a logical
result of previous decisions in the jurisdiction in which the principal case was
decided.
PUB.IC SERvICE CORPORA-riOS--PvBLtC UTILITY-WATER SuPPLY.-The
plaintiff was a water supply company organized under the general corporation
laws of its state to furnish water at wholesale to municipalities and to other
water companies, these in turn serving the public. No benefits, such as eminent domain, were accepted by the company, other than the privilege of incorporating. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners made an order fixing the plaintiff's rates. I!ld: The plaintiff was not a public utility and hence
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board. Acquackanonk W~atcr Co. v.
Board of Public Utility Con'rs, 118 Atl. .535 (N. J. 1922).
A water supply company is by nature qualified to be, but is not necessarily, a public service corporation. See Wyman, Public Service Corps, Sec.
242 (1911 ed.) and cases there collected. The character of such companies is
determined largely by two factors: (I) an actual or implied profession to undertake a public service, and (2) the right of the public to the service. Mere
declaration of intention in a charter does not amount to a sufficient profession. Brown v. Gerald, ioo Me. 351, 6x AtI. 785 (9o5) ; Tacoma v. White
River Power Co., 39 Wash. 648, 82 Pac. 5o (i9o5); Allen v. Railroad ComThe right of the public to the
mission, 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pac. 466 (i918).
service must be clear. In the Matter of Eureka Co., 96 N. Y. 42 (1894);
Brown v. Gerald, supra. Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co., 224- N. Y. 6o
(1918); Holmes Electric Protective Co. v. Williams, 228 N. Y. 407 (9xo).
Whether or not the service professed is one in which the public has a right
rests with the courts for determination. Olmstead v. Proprietors of the Morris
Aqueduct, 47 N. J. L. 311 (1885) ; Pocantico V. W. Co. v. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249
(i89i); Bowden v. York Shore Water Co., 114 lie. 15o, 95 At. 779 (1915).
The holding in the instant case is based on the assumption that as the
general public had no direct right to the service rendered by the company, the
important element of duty to serve the public was absent. Avery v. Vermont
Electric Co., 75 Vt. 235, s4 AtI. 179 (ig90); Marin Water & Power Co. v.
Town of Sausalito, x68 Cal 587, 143 Pac. 70 (1914); see, also, O'Neil v. Marseilles Land & Power Co. (Ill.) P. U. R. 1919 D, 732. There is authority for
the opposite view, however, based on the reasoning that such water supply
conpanies hold themselves out as ready to supply municipalities and water distributing companies, thus becoming public service corporations as to the class
of consumers they purport to serve. See Wyman, Public Service Corps., See.
479 (1911 ed.); City of Alameda v. Railroad Commission, 183 Cal. 229, 191
Pac. z (192o) ; City of Cimarron v. The Midland Co. e al., 1o Kan. 812, 2o5
Pac. 603 (1922); see, also, Re Central Illinois Public Service Co. (Ill.) P, U.
R. 1919 B, 833; Hancock v. East Side Canal Co. (Cal.) P. U. R. 1922 A, 823;
J. D. Whitehouse v. United Natural Gas Co. (Pa.) P. U. R. 1922 B, is-.
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QUASI-CONTRACTS-RECOVERY FOR SERVICES RENDERED AS SUPPOSED WIFE.M-

The plaintiff had entered into a civil contract of marriage with the deceased
upon the latter's fraudulent representation that the divorce he received from
his first wife was an absolute one whereas in reality it was a decree from
bed and board only. Later, learning that he had no legal right to marry her,
the plaintiff filed a claim against his estate for services rendered and for rent
of the house with which she had provided him. Held (two justice's dissenting) : Recovery allowed. In re Fox's Eslate, Too N. W. go (Wis. 1922).
Recovery has been denied by some courts under identical facts for one or
more of the following reasons: (t) The general rule is to be applied that na
recovery can be had for services rendered and received without expectation of
pay. The intention of the plaintiff, the courts have said, was "to act as a wife"
and "not as a hired servant." Cooper v. Cooper, 1471 Mass. 370, 372, 17 N. E.
892 (1888). For the general rule, see Woodward, Quasi-Contracts 74 el seq.
(1913). (2) The act of the deceased in fraudulently inducing theplaintiff tdl
enter into a void marriage gave rise to an ex delicto action for a personal injury, Grim v. Carr's Adms., 31 Pa. s33 (1858); Price v. Price, 75 N. Y. 244
(1878) ; (see also, the dissenting opinion in the principal case), and a waiver
of this tort will not create a right of action in contract. Cooper v. Cooper,
supra; Payne's Appeal, 65 Conn. 397, 32 Atl. 948 (i895). (3) No promise to
pay will ever be implied where services are rendered by a person because of
the position or relation which he occupies with reference to him for whom he
acts. Franklin v. Waters, 8 Gill 322 (Md. 1849); Lafontain v. Hayhurst, 89
Me. .388 (i896) ; Graham v. Stanton, 177 Mass. 32, 58 N. E. 1923 0901). In
the fact that she believed
Cooper v. Cooper, supra, the court said: "...
herself to be a wife excludes the inference that the society and assistance of a
wife which she gave to her supposed husband were for hire."
The courts allowing recovery, on the other hand, have proceeded on the
reasoning that since the supposed husband has wrongfully enriched himself at
the expense of the plaintiff, the latter has the right "to be made whole."
The supposed husband is held to have assumed to pay because in point of law
and equity it is just he should pay. Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 497 (1845);
Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777 (1916). This is the better view
and has found favor among the text-writers. Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 320 ef
seq. (1893 ed.); Woodward, Quasi-Contracts 453 (1913 ed.) Each of the
arguments upon which the contrary view rests should fall before the fact
that the services were rendered only because of the fraud of the defendant,
who thereby received a benefit for which he ought to pay. See 65 U. OF PA.
It was argued in the principal case that recovery
L. REV. 584 (1916-1917).
should be denied because the services were rendered under a mistake of law.
It is submitted, the court properly rejected the distinction. See, as to this
point, 36 HARV. L Ray. 487 (Igas).
QCAS1-CONTRACTS-S IvCFS RFvERFD IN THE FAMILY RFLATION.-X., an
elderly woman who lived in Seattle, becoming very ill, sent a telegram to the

plaintiff, her stepson, who resided in Pennsylvania. As a result, the plaintiff
went to Seattle and remained there a week. After X.'s death, a few days
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later, the plaintiff put in a claim against the estate for traveling expenses.
Held: The claim should be allowed. Cramer v. Clark, -09 Pac. 688 (Wash.
1922).

In the absence of any relationship between two persons, where one, in the
expectation of payment, renders services for the other with the latter's acquiescence, the law will imply a contract for payment. Hughes v. Dundee. ekr.,
Co., 21 Fed. 169 (C. C. z884) ; Hunt v. Osborn, 40 Ind. App. 646, 86 N. E. 933
(")7) ; Wojahn v. National Union Bank, 144 Wis. 646, ui-9 N. W. ;o68 (igzi).
But the rule is practically universally accepted that there will be no such implication and the services will be presumed gratuitous, where rendered to
each other by "members of a family, living as one household." Disbrow v.
Durand, 54 N. J. L 343, 24 Ati. 545 (1&)2); Woodward, Quasi-Contracts
(1913 ed.) 84, and cases cited. It is not the consanguinity or affinity of the
parties that invokes the rule, Elesser v. Mead, 197 N. Y. S. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1922),
but rather the family relationship, so that it has been held not to extend to
- services
rendered by one who, though a near blood relative, is a member
of a household distinct from that of the defendant. Steel v. Steel, 12 Pa. 64
(1849); Williams v. Williams, IT4 Wis. 79, 89 N. W. 835 (1902) ; Page v.
Page, 73 N. I. IoS, 61 Atl. 356 (io5) ; Winkler v. Killian, 141 X. C. 575, St
S. H. 54o (l'6). See, however, Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 129 Pa. z9, iS
Ati. i" (i889). Although it is not clear in all of the cases, it would appear
that recovery should not be allowed, in such situations, unless there has been a
request for the services by the defendant. Moycer's Appeal, ii, Pa. =ago, ,3AtI.

811 0886).
The court in the principal case based its decision on the fact that a "family
relation" did not exist between the parties. The requirement that the plaintiff should have rendered the services expecting payment was not mentioned.
As to whether the "services" were of such a character as to raise the presumption of a promise to pay, the court had nothing to say except that no contention had been made to the contrary. Yet, it is submitted, a different decision
might well have been reached by a more careful examination of those features of the case. Altogether, it appeared, on its surface, to be merely another case of a plaintiff who did an act with a view to a legacy and who
tl'.,n, being disappointed, resorted to an action of implied assumpsit. See
Swires v. Parsons, 5 W. & S. 357 (Pa. 1843).

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMNT--COMPUTATION OF PERIOD

CE.-The plaintiff brought suit on an oral contract of employment for one year, by the terms of which he could have commenced performance the next day. The defendant pleaded the statute of frauds [Comp-law
8
(Mich. 1915), See. 1i ., ;i] which made void "every agreement that by its terms
is not to be performed in one, year from the making thereof." Held (three justices dissenting) : The agreement was not within the statute. Dykerna v. Story
& Clark Piano Co., 19o N. W. 638 (Mich. 1922).

OF PFRFORMA.

The decision of the court is founded expressly on the rule that the law
does not regard fractions of a day. In so holding the court follows the de-
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ciions in Alabama and New York. Dickson v. Frisbee, 52 Ala. 165 (1875);
Prokop v. Bedford, etc., Co., 173 N. Y. S. 702. 105 Misc. Rep. 573 (1910).
But in both those states there are statutc which provide that the clay from.
which any specified period of time is reckoned shall be excluded in the makilg of the reckoning. Outside of New York and Alabama, there are no
American cases exactly in point hut 27 C. J. it states the rule to be that an
oral contract for one year is within the statute even though it may begin the
next day on the ground that the statutory period commences with the date of
the agreement. Chase v. Ilinkley, 1u6 Wis. 75, 105 N. W. 230 (mqoS) ; Keller
v. Mayer Fertilizer Co.. t53 Mo. App. 12o. 32- S. W. 31.1 (19ro) ; Carroll v.
Palmer Mfg. Co., 181 Mich. 28o, 14,8 N. W. 390 (1T4).
For their authority, the majority jurisdictions in this country refer to the
case of Bracegirdle v. Ileald, I B. & Aid. 7-3 (Eng. 1818), where Lord Ellenborough stated that "any excess of the year periol, however short, is :-ufficient to satisfy the statute." But there the contract involved was made on
May 27th to commence June 3oth and the specific question involved in the
principal case did not arise. Later that opinion was controverted by dicta in
the case of Cawthrone v. Codrey, 13 C. B. (X. S.), 4o6 (1863). The modern
tendency in England seems to favor the dicta of the later case. Smith v.
Gold Coast, etc., Ltd.. i K. B. _85 (19o3) and that view has also been adopted
in Canada. Belier v. Klotz, 9 Sask. L. R. 419 (1916).
The opinion of tile majority of the court, it is submitted, is the more just
one. It would seem that the framers of the statute, Mhen they prescribed that
a contract to be performed within one year from the makhmg thereof need not
be in writing, must have had in mind ihe fact that contracts for a year's
services are usually made in the course of tbe day prtceding the beginning of
performance.

T.%x.rUmx-CoaroRRATIo.s-LoA.%s.-.Actili was brought by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to collect from the defendant corporation a tax on
mortgages upon its property, which were held by individuals in the state. The
defendant claimed that under the Pennsylvania statute such mortgages here
taxable only by the county. Held: The state is entitled to the tax. Commonu'ealth z. Megargee, 275 Pa. 12 (1922).
On the same day the court handed down decisions that promissory notes
of corporations, and bonds secured by mortgages, were taxable by the state
under the Pennsylvania statute. Philadelphia Co. v. Guaranty Co., 275 Pa. iS
(1922) ; Commonwealth v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 275 Pa. 2o (1922).
The Act of 1913, P. L. 5o7. Sec. 17, as amended by the Act of 1919, P.
L. 95, makes taxable by the stat-- "all scrip, bonds and certificates and evidences of indebtedness issued fand all scrip, bonds and certificates and evidences of indehtedness assumed. or on which interest shall be paidi by any
..
private corporation."
The words in brackets are added by the
amendatory Act of 1919. which goes on: "It is the intent of this Act that
. . . only such scrip, bonds, certificates and evidences of indebtedness which
cannot be made taxable under this section are taxable under section t [for

RECE'T CASES
county purposes]." Jiefore the amendatory Act was passcd, this section (17)
was very strictly construed, and under it the court held that the state could
not tax car trust certificates., Commonwealth v. Lehigh & New England R. R.
Co., _-68 Pa. -71, 110 At. 721 (192o), promissory notes, whether discounted
by bankers or held by individuals, Commonwealth v. Roxford Knitting Co.,
ig'o) ; Commonwealth v. Janesvillc Coal Co., 25
268 Pa. -60, 11o At. 7"0
)auphin Co. Rep. z28 (1,2,), or any loan to the corporation not evidenced
by any obligation issued by it. but merely by a notation on the corporation's
books. Commonwealth v Lancaster L. H. E. Co., 268 Pa. _-WJ,11o Atd. 724
The basis of the foregoing decisions (except the last-mentioned,
(192o).
which would probably be the same under the Act either before or after its
amendment) seems to be that promissory notes and car trust certificates were
specifically mentioned as taxable for county purposes under section i of the
Act of 1913, and that the.e specific provisions should take precedence over
the general provisions of section 17. The same reasoning would have exempted
corporate murtgages from state taxation under the Act of 1913. But under the amendatory Act of i919, the Court held, in tile principal case, that if
irreconcilable conflict ever appears, section 17 must govern because of the
clearly expressed legislative intent in the final clause of the Act, and that
therefore, the specific words of section i could no longer control the general
words of section 17. So under these cases promissory notes, mortgages and
bonds secured by mortgages are held taxable. It would seem that the amendatory Act and this interpretation of it have again harmonized the law on this
point, which the Act of 1913 threw into confusion, and that now again all evidences of corporate indebtedness on -wlich interest is paid by the corporation
are taxable by the state, and the state alone

TRUSTS--CoMMINLN; oF FtNs--RecovFRY oF TRsr F.wDs.-The %V.
Commission Company deposited in its account in the defendant bank certain
money belonging to the plaintiff and held by it in a fiduciary capacity. The
plaintiff sued the bank, its demand for the money having been refused. Held:
Judgment for the plaintiff. Cable v. ioua State Sa,. Bank, i9o N. W. 262
(Iowa 1gz).
Cerain arbitrary rules as to the rights of ce'tuis que trust have been laid
down by the courts in deciding cases in which trust funds have been commingled by the trustees with other money. It is a general rule that if a
trustee deposits at different times the moneys of two cestuis que trust in one
account, and subsequently makes withdrawals from the common fund, the
first withdrawals are charged against the first deposit. Clayton's Case, z Mer.
572 (Eng. 1816) ; United Nat'l Bank v. Weatherby, 7o App. Div. 279, 75 N. Y.
S. 3 (102) ; Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. 593, 114 C
C. A. 435 (19i). The early cases held that this rule applied also when the
moneys of the trustee and the cestuis que trust were deposited in a single
account. Pennell v. Deffel, 4 De G. M. & G. 372 (Eng. 1853); Browne v.
Adams, L R. 4 Ch. 764 (Eng. x869). But it is now universally held that in the
latter case. as long as a balance always remains in the bank, as large as the
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amount of the claimants' trust fund, a trust is impresqed upon the whole account to the extent of the trust fund. Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 731
(Eng. 1879) ; Blair v. flill, 5o App. Div. 33, 6.3N. Y. S. 67o (19o) ; In re
Stewart, 178 Fed. 463 (D. C. 19io). Furthermore, the courts presume that
the trustee checked out his own money first, and not the trust money. In re
tholmes, 37 App. Div. 15, 55 N. Y. S. 7o8 (i899) ; In re Ponzi, 20 Fed. 193
(D. C. 192) ; Garnst v. Canfield, i6 Atl. 482 (R. I. 1922).
It is generally held that if the balance in the bank at some time falls
below the amount of the trust money, the equitable charge on the account
can never exceed the smallest balance to which the trustee's credit falls at
any time, unless, of course, trust money is subsequently added. Woodhouse
v. Crandal, 197 Il. io4, 64 N. E. .292 (192); Board of Com'rs. v. Strawn,
157 Fed. 49, 84 C. C. A. i53 (1907); Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 91
N. E. 332 (1910). And if the fun'd at any time is exhausted, the interest
of the c'stui que trust is lost. Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U. S. 707 (1914).
Even though the trustee subsequently deposits other money, not held in trust,
to the same account, the courts usually decide that these amounts cannot be
treated as a replacement of the trust funds; nor will a trust be impressed
upon such deposits. Dowie v. Humphrey, 91 Wis. 98, 64 N. W. 3t5 (1895) ;
Htewitt v. Hughes, supra; In re Brown, 189 Fed. 432 (D.C. 1911). But some
courts presume that it is the intention of the trustee to huild up the trust
iund when he deposits his own funds in the same account and so allow
such replacements to be impressed with the trust. United Nati. Bank v.
Weatherby, supra; Garast v. Canfield, supra.

ORKE'S

~Co-IPENSArTION-INTERSTATE

COMMERCF-NATURtE OF EMPLOY-

up scrap and pull weeds
around tracks in a yard used by interstate trains, was injured while so engaged. The evidence tended to show he was pulling weeds at the time he
was struck. Held: The commission was justified in finding that he was not engaged in interstate commerce. Quirk v. Erie R. Co., i96 N. Y. S. 58o (App. Div.
iiN..-Ai employee, whose duty it was to pick

1922).

One line of cases in the United States Supreme Court makes the actual
thing the employee was doing, at the time he was injured, the test in determining whether or not he was injured in interstate commerce. In Illinois Central
R. R. v. Behrens, 2,33 U. S. 473 (1914), an employee on a switching engine
which moved both interstate and intrastate cars was injured while moving
an intrastate car, and was held not engaged in interstate commerce even
though he afterwards expected to move interstate cars. An employee injured while repairing an engine was held not to be engaged in interstate commerce as the engine had not been definitely assigned to interstate trains. Minn.
& St. L. R. R. v. Winters. 242 U. S. 353 (1917). These cases do not take into
account the fact that the employee's work was both interstate and intrastate,
alternately. This seems to have been the test applied in the principal case, for
the court there said tile employee was engaged in interstate commerce when
picking up scrap, but was not so engaged when pulling weeds. The court's
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reason was that whereas in the former instance he was removing what might
have been a hindrance to interstate commerce, in the latter he was merely
beautifying the yard.
A more recent tendency in the Supreme Court, however, has been to regard as interstate any work where the duties are partly of that nature and it
is not practicable to divide them into definite periods. In N. Y. Central R. R.
v. Porter, 249 U. S. j68 (Igi9), a workman, who was shoveling snow from
between a track and platform used by both interstate and intrastate trains,
was held engaged in interstate commerce. A watchman at a crossing where
both classes of trains passed was held engaged in interstate commerce. Phila.
An even stronger
& Reading Ry. Co. v. Di Donato, 256 U. S. 327 (i.i).
example of this principle is to. be found in N. Y. Central R. R. v. Carr, 238
U. S. 26o (i9iS), where a brakeman on a train of both interstate and intrastate
cars was injured while cutting off an intrastate car, and yet was held to have
been injured in interstate commerce.
It is submitted that the principal case might better have been placed in this
latter class, for the type of work being done was difficult of subdivision and
part was admittedly interstate. As to the burden of proving the nature of the
employment, see 70 U. oF PA. L. REv. Ii5 (i921-22).

